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Credit card lenders have been writing off loans at sharply higher rates since 1995, suggesting
that riskier borrowers are acquiring credit cards. What makes the new borrowers riskier—
even more than their personal characteristics and attitudes toward debt—is the fact that they
carry higher debt burdens and work in occupations where income may be more cyclical.
likely to rent, and had less job seniority than cardholders
in 1989. The new borrowers were also more willing to
borrow, and to borrow for seemingly riskier purposes,
such as vacation. 
While these changes in personal characteristics and
attitudes imply a higher risk of delinquency, we con-
clude that they are relatively unimportant in explaining
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A democratization of credit cards is occurring in
America.1 According to the Survey of Consumer
Finances, only 43 percent of U.S. households in 1983
had a MasterCard, Visa, or some other general purpose
credit card.2 By 1995, that share had jumped to 66 per-
cent. Credit card carriers in the 1980s seemed like an
elite club; now it seems that anyone can join. 
Today’s wider distribution of credit cards suggests that
lenders are reaching out to riskier borrowers.3 Credit card
charge-offs—the bad loans that banks write off in a given
year—turned upward sharply near the beginning of 1995
(see chart). Expressed as a percentage of all credit card
loans, the annual charge-off rate rose to 6 percent in
1997—the highest in twenty-five years. The national
slowdown in job growth in 1995 surely contributed to this
rise in bad debt, yet charge-offs rose disproportionately
and continued to rise even after job growth rebounded in
1996.4 Even the slowdown in 1989, which ended in a
recession, did not lead to as much bad debt as the mild
slowdown did a few years ago. Something besides macro-
economic conditions is behind the rise in bad debt.
This edition of Current Issues investigates how the
mix of cardholders has changed and identifies charac-
teristics that seem to make the new borrowers riskier.
Comparing data from the 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finances with data from the 1989 survey, we find that
cardholders in 1995 were more apt to be single, more
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1989 1995the overall rise in bad debt. Much more important is the
higher debt burden among cardholders: the new bor-
rowers owe substantially more relative to their income,
so even small drops in income can cause financial 
distress. Type of occupation also matters. The new 
borrowers are more likely to work in relatively unskilled
blue-collar jobs; delinquency rates are higher among
such workers, perhaps because their income is more
closely tied to the business cycle. Greater indebtedness
and the shift in cardholding toward people in more 
cyclical occupations help explain how such a mild eco-
nomic slowdown in 1995 could have driven charge-offs
so high today. 
The Changing Mix of Cardholders
The Survey of Consumer Finances lets us view the new
borrowers from several angles, including their personal
characteristics, income, balance sheets, occupations,
even attitudes (Table 1).5 We use the 1995 survey—the
most recent—and the 1989 survey. While data from
1995 may seem outdated, they are nearly ideal for our
purposes. Credit card loans have to season for eighteen
months or so before they go bad, implying that the
charge-offs in the last year or two partly reflect the bad
seeds in the 1995 crop of cardholders. Comparing
cardholders in 1995 with those in 1989 is also ideal.
Since the economy was slowing in both years, we are
less likely to mistake differences in macro conditions
for changes in the micro mix of cardholders. The only
downside to the Survey of Consumer Finances is 
that the set of households covered changes over time.
Since the set of households is not constant, we cannot
identify exactly the marginal cardholder—the riskiest
household that obtained a card sometime between 
1989 and 1995. Instead, we look for changes in the
average cardholder; if the average cardholder looks
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Table 1
The Changing Profile of Cardholders
Borrower Characteristics 1989 1995 Borrower Characteristics 1989 1995
Cardholding and borrowing Median stock and bond holdings 0 0
Percentage of all households with credit cards 55.8 66.5* Mean holdings $19,587 $28,602
Percentage with five or more cards 7.8 11.2 Liquid asset holdingsa $6,468 $4,700*
Limit on all credit cards $6,098 $8,800 Debt as a percentage of incomeb 48.3 55.0*
Median credit card balance $122 $200* Debt payments as a percentage of incomec 12.1 16.7*
Mean balance $1,134 $1,671 Percentage of cardholders in occupations
Personal characteristics Executive/manager 31.5 25.8*
Age of head of household 45 46 Sales/administrative support 19.6 19.3
Percentage married 66.7 61.0* Service 4.5 6.3*
Percentage owning a home 70.7 67.3* Precision production/repair 11.9 9.9*
Median years at current address 9.0 6.0* Operators/laborers 7.3 12.5*
Mean number of years 11.6 11.1 Farmers 1.3 1.6
Median years at current full-time employer 4.0 4.0 Retired 16.9 18.1
Mean number of years 7.9 7.4* Not working 23.8 24.6
Income, assets, and debt Percentage of cardholders who think
Family income $42,683 $38,000* it is “all right” to borrow for
Percentage earning less than $10,000 4.7 6.6* Vacation 13.3 17.3*
$10,000-$24,999 17.5 21.3* Living expenses when income is cut 40.1 44.0*
$25,000-$49,999 36.4 35.3 Fur or jewelry purchase 7.0 7.6
$50,000-$99,999 29.4 27.4 Car purchase 86.3 85.8
More than $100,000 12.0 9.4* Education 85.4 85.5
Memo:
Number of observationsd 2,107 3,257
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Survey of Consumer Finances.
Notes: Dollar figures are in 1995 dollars. Unless otherwise noted, figures are median amounts, where the median is defined as the midpoint of the distribution. Credit cards are
defined as VISA, MasterCard, Optima, and Discover. Asterisks indicate figures that differ from their 1989 values at or below the 5 percent level of significance.
aLiquid asset holdings include balances in checking accounts, savings accounts, call accounts at brokerages, certificates of deposit, and mutual funds.
bDebt includes debt owed to the family’s business and debt held on property that is rented by the family.
cDebt payments exclude credit card payments.
dObservations are weighted to reflect the U.S. population as a whole.3
riskier, we can infer that risky borrowers are joining 
the pool.6
Cardholding and Borrowing
“More” and “higher” summarize the changes in card-
holding and borrowing patterns between 1989 and
1995: more cards, higher limits, more borrowing. More
than 66 percent of all households had a credit card in
1995, up from 56 percent in 1989 (Table 1). Two is still
the median number of cards per household, but holding
three or even five cards is increasingly common.7
Credit limits are also higher. The median limit available
per card increased by $900, or roughly one-third.
Cardholders took advantage of the higher limits by 
borrowing more: the mean balance increased from
about $1,100 in 1989 to about $1,700 in 1995.8
Personal Characteristics
The safest borrowers are usually presumed to be married
homeowners with deep roots in the neighborhood and
substantial seniority at work. If these personal charac-
teristics are important, then the new borrowers could be
riskier.9 Only 61.0 percent of cardholders were married
in 1995, compared with 66.7 percent in 1989. Fewer
cardholders were homeowners in 1995, and cardholders
had lived at their current address, whether owned or
rented, for a shorter period: median residency at a card-
holder’s current address declined from nine to six years.
Cardholders in 1995 also had less job seniority: the
average cardholder in 1995 had worked six months less
at his or her job.
Age is another potential determinant of credit risk:
older borrowers, all else equal, may be more respon-
sible about paying bills.The median cardholder in 1995
was actually a year older than the corresponding card-
holder in 1989, so the new borrowers do not appear
riskier by that criterion. What Table 1 does not show,
however, is a significant increase in the share of young
households carrying credit cards. According to the 
survey, 45.5 percent of households headed by an 
eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-old had a card in 1995,
compared with just 33.7 percent in 1989.
Income, Assets, and Debt
Lower income households now have greater access to
credit cards. The median annual income of cardholders
fell $4,700 between 1989 and 1995 as the distribution
of cardholders shifted toward those with lower incomes.
In 1989, 78 percent of cardholders were middle or
upper class (with an annual income of $25,000 or more
in 1995 dollars). By 1995, this figure had dropped to
72 percent. The share of lower income cardholders 
rose accordingly over this period, from 22 percent to 
28 percent.
The weaker balance sheets of cardholders in 1995
also suggest higher risk. Holdings of stocks and bonds
actually rose on average. However, since half of all
cardholders in 1995 held no stocks or bonds, the
decline in cardholders’ liquid assets is more revealing:
the median holding fell from $6,468 in 1989 to $4,700
in 1995, a drop of more than 25 percent. As liquidity
was falling, indebtedness was rising. The ratio of total
debt to income rose from 48 percent to 55 percent over
the period. The ratio of debt payments to income,
which reflects interest on the debt, rose from 12 per-
cent to 17 percent. When borrowers are so heavily
indebted, even small drops in income can trigger finan-
cial distress.
Occupations
Credit cards are no longer a privilege of white-collar
workers. Although executives and managers still made
up the largest share of cardholders in 1995, their share
had declined 5.7 percentage points from 1989. Con-
versely, the least skilled blue-collar workers, operators
and laborers, increased their presence among cardhold-
ers by 5.2 percentage points. Because these workers
may be more exposed to wage cuts and layoffs than
white-collar workers, they may benefit greatly from
increased access to credit. By the same token, greater
income variability also means that these workers may
be riskier borrowers.
Attitudes
Risk also depends on attitudes, and the new borrowers
seem to take a riskier view toward credit. Participants
in the Survey of Consumer Finances are asked whether
it is “all right for someone like yourself” to borrow for
certain purposes.10 Most cardholders in 1989 said they
approved of borrowing to buy a car or to pay for educa-
tion but they disapproved of buying fur and jewelry or
taking a vacation on credit. Only 40 percent of cardhold-
ers in 1989 said they approved of borrowing to cover
living expenses after a drop in income. By 1995, signifi-
cantly more cardholders approved of borrowing to take a
vacation or to cover living expenses after a cut in
income. These more relaxed attitudes help explain why
cardholders owe more relative to their income.
Moreover, these specific uses of credit may be espe-
cially risky because they do not necessarily produce an
asset that the lender can claim.11
Household Profiles and Delinquency Risk
Overall, the new cardholders seem riskier in several
ways. They are less likely to be married and more apt to
rent. They owe more (relative to income), have less
work seniority, and are more likely to work in relatively
unskilled blue-collar jobs, where income cuts and 
layoffs may be more commonplace. Even their attitudes
toward credit have become more relaxed—they are 
willing to borrow more, and to borrow for seemingly
riskier purposes.But do these changes really make today’s borrowers
riskier? We can answer this question using additional
information in the Survey of Consumer Finances.
Survey participants are asked if they were late on any
payment in the year before the survey.12 Using their
responses, we are able to identify the household char-
acteristics in Table 1 that contribute to delinquency
risk. Table 2 reports the change in the probability of
delinquency associated with a small change in each
characteristic, holding other characteristics constant.13
A negative value indicates that increases in that variable
are associated with decreases in delinquency risk. An
asterisk next to a variable indicates that the measured
impact is statistically significant and not due to a mere
fluke in the sample.
What Determines Delinquency Risk?
A household’s debt burden turns out to be a crucial
determinant of delinquency risk. Households whose
ratio of debt payments to income is 1 percentage point
higher than average are about 10 percent more likely to
have been delinquent. Large holdings of stocks and
bonds reduce the risk of delinquency, but the impact is
small and insignificant in the statistical sense. Holdings
of liquid assets lower delinquency risk more dramati-
cally, presumably because they are a better buffer
against unexpected changes in income. The one curious
result is the positive relationship observed between
income and delinquency risk. Higher income house-
holds may simply have more types of debt, so they have
more payments to make, or miss.14
Delinquency risk also depends on a household’s per-
sonal characteristics. Younger households are riskier, as
are less educated ones. Homeownership and longer res-
idential tenure tend to reduce delinquency risk,
although the impact of both variables is essentially zero
in the statistical sense. Households with longer job
tenure also have lower delinquency risk. The delin-
quency rate among married households is 2.4 percent
lower than it is among single or divorced households. 
Occupation also affects the probability of delin-
quency. Operators and laborers, who now account for a
larger share of cardholders, have significantly higher
delinquency rates than managers and professionals.15
The higher delinquency rate of these occupations could
reflect the fact that operators and laborers work in some
of the most cyclical sectors of the economy, such as
housing, so their income is likely to be very responsive
to the business cycle. Indeed, we found that the differ-
ence between delinquency rates for executives and blue-
collar workers is significantly larger in more indebted
households, exactly what we would expect to find if the
difference in delinquency rates reflected differences in
income variability.16
Which Changes Matter Most?
Since the mix of individuals holding credit cards has
changed along several lines, we want to know which
changes matter most in explaining the higher risk of
charge-offs. A “back-of-the-envelope” calculation is
helpful here. By multiplying the change in each charac-
teristic in Table 1 by the impact of that characteristic on
delinquency risk from Table 2, we get the total impact
of the change in that characteristic on delinquency risk.
Although this calculation is too imprecise to gauge the
absolute impact of each change, it does give us a sense
of each change’s relative importance.17
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Table 2
Which Household Characteristics Affect 
Delinquency Risk?
Variable Change
Income, assets, and debt
Debt payments as a percentage of income 9.93*
Total debt as a percentage of income 0.51
Stocks and bonds ($100,000 units) -0.21
Liquid assets ($100,000 units) -6.06*
Income (log units) 2.36*
Personal characteristics
Age -0.23*
Years of education -0.61*
Homeowner -0.78
Years at address -0.01
Years at job -0.27*
Self-employed 0.91
Married -2.39*






Attitudes: belief that it is “all right” to borrow for
Vacation -1.41
Living expenses when income is cut 2.26*
Fur or jewelry purchase -1.50
Car purchase 3.72*
Education 0.43
Source: Authors’calculations, based on data from the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Survey of Consumer Finances.
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in delinquency risk associated
with a small change in each variable. The impact of each variable is estimated
holding the other variables constant. The impact is derived from a probit regres-
sion estimated over all households in the Survey of Consumer Finances in 1989
and 1995 (7,314 observations). The dependent variable of the regression equation
indicates whether a household was delinquent on any payment in the year before
each survey. The regression also controls for the year of the survey (not reported).
Debt burdens are rescaled between 0 and 1.
*Statistically significant at or below the 5 percent level.The higher debt burden among cardholders seems 
to be foremost in explaining the higher risk of 
charge-offs. The median debt-payments-to-income ratio
among cardholders increased 5 percentage points
between 1989 and 1995. Recall from Table 2 that a 
1-percentage-point increase in that ratio raises delin-
quency risk by about 10 percent. Multiplying these 
figures suggests that the higher debt burden increased
delinquency risk by .50 percentage point. The charge-
off rate increased about 2.5 percentage points in recent
years, implying that the higher debt burden could
explain roughly 20 percent (.5/2.5) of the rise in
charge-offs. 
The occupational shift among cardholders also 
matters. Operators and laborers held 5.2 percent more
credit cards in 1995, and they are about 4.0 percent
more likely to be delinquent, implying that this factor
could explain as much as 8.0 percent of the rise in
charge-offs (.052 x 4/2.5). Although secondary to the
higher debt burden, the occupational shift contributed
materially to the increased riskiness of borrowers.
Changes in demographics and attitudes seem to be
the least important factors in explaining higher risk.
Married households are about 2.4 percent less likely to
be delinquent, and their share of cardholders declined
by 5.7 percent, so increased cardholding by single
households could account for about 5.0 percent of the
rise in charge-offs. A one-year decline in job tenure
increases delinquency risk by only 0.3 percent, and job
tenure among cardholders fell by about half a year, so
changing job tenure could explain another 6.0 percent.
Attitudes may affect charge-offs indirectly, but their
direct impact here is small: about 4.0 percent more
cardholders are willing to borrow to cover living
expenses when income is cut, and households with this
attitude are 2.3 percent more likely to be delinquent, so
this change in attitude might account for only about 
4.0 percent of the rise in charge-offs. 
Conclusion
A comparison of the 1989 and 1995 versions of the
Survey of Consumer Finances helps us understand the
recent increase in credit card charge-offs. The new bor-
rowers owe substantially more relative to income than
did their counterparts in the late 1980s, making them
vulnerable to even small drops in income and job
growth. The strong link we found between debt burdens
and delinquency rates suggests that this increase in debt
burdens among cardholders is the most important factor
behind the recent rise in bad debt.
Also important is the changing occupational mix of
cardholders. The new borrowers are more likely to work
in relatively unskilled blue-collar occupations, where
delinquency rates are higher—perhaps because income
in these occupations is more closely tied to the business
cycle. Combined with higher debt burdens, increased
cardholding by cyclical workers clarifies how a mild
economic slowdown in 1995 could trigger a steep rise
in bad debt.
Notes
1. Former Federal Reserve Governor Lindsey (1997) used the term
“democratization” to describe the wider distribution of credit cards.
2. The Survey of Consumer Finances, conducted every three years
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, collects
information on a cross-section of about 4,000 households represent-
ing the U.S. population as a whole. The survey focuses on household
wealth and other financial characteristics.
3. This article does not examine whether the wider distribution of
credit cards reflects an increased supply of cards, an increased demand
for cards, or both. For more on that issue, see Morgan and Toll (1997).
4. The doubling of the federal bankruptcy exemption in 1994 may
also have contributed to the rise in charge-offs. However, the change
in the federal exemption would have had no effect on bankruptcy
rates in states where the exemptions permitted by state law still
exceeded the federal exemption.
5. A borrower is a household with at least one general purpose
credit card, such as a Visa, MasterCard, Optima, or Discover. We
exclude gas and store cards because they are limited-use credit
cards. We also exclude American Express cards because they are
charge cards, not credit cards. Using the survey sample of roughly
4,000, we “blow up” the statistics to the population equivalents
using the weights provided in the survey. The survey includes five
observations for each household as a means of imputing missing
values. As is common, we use only the first implicate of the data.
This will not bias the estimates, but their variance will be somewhat
understated (Montalto and Sung 1996).
6. A rise in average risk implies that the marginal borrower has
become riskier if we assume that the households that had cards all
along have not become riskier.
7. The average and median of a distribution differ when the distrib-
ution is skewed. The average of {1,2,6} is 3; the median (midpoint)
of this distribution is 2. 
8. The mean balance reflects the amount owed after a cardholder’s
most recent payment. The much lower median balance (that is, the
midpoint) reflects households that carry a zero balance. 
9. Married households with two sources of income may be better
diversified; homeowners may be more stable financially and less
likely to move to flee creditors; workers with greater seniority may
face a lower risk of layoff. Note that even if the changes in personal
characteristics between 1989 and 1995 reflected changes in the popu-
lation as a whole, we would still conclude that cardholders were
becoming riskier.
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10. “All right” means different things to different people, but those
differences will tend to cancel out across categories.
11. Education loans do, however, produce human capital, income
from which can be garnisheed.
12. Since the question is not about credit cards in particular, we
cannot be completely precise. Nevertheless, characteristics associ-
ated with general delinquency should be correlated with credit card
delinquency and, later on, with charge-offs.
13. We estimated the equation delinquenti = a + b*profilei + ei,
where delinquenti indicates if household I was delinquent on any
payment in the year before the survey and profilei includes the full
list of characteristics in Table 1, plus dummy variables indicating the
year. We estimated the equation over all households in 1989 and
1995; by excluding noncardholders, we would have raised selection
issues and wasted information about the link between risk and
household characteristics. With the exception of a few characteris-
tics that did not change much in the first place (age, marital status,
and tenure at job and residence), the coefficients were stable across
both years. Our equation predicts reasonably well: the actual delin-
quency rate averaged 16.5 percent in both years, and our equation,
evaluated at the mean of each variable, predicted a 13.0 percent rate. 
14. Consistent with that reasoning, we found that the positive income
effect disappears when we estimate the regression for cardholders only.
15. Note that we are comparing people in different occupations
who earned the same level of income, so the difference in delin-
quency rates probably reflects the fact that income in some occupa-
tions is more variable. Income in the services sector is relatively 
stable, for example, because services, unlike goods, cannot be
stored; people continue to pay for haircuts, insurance, and other 
services during a downturn, but they can cut their purchases of
goods by consuming their previous purchases more slowly.
16. We added interaction terms to our regression equation: occupa-
tion*debt payments/income. The coefficient on operators/labor-
ers*debt payments/income was 13.2 percent and was significant
below the 5 percent level. None of the other interaction terms was
significant. Farber (1997) reports that the probability of job loss
averaged 14.8 percent among blue-collar workers between 1989 and
1995, compared with only 8.9 percent for executives and managers.
17. Because all delinquencies do not wind up as charge-offs, this
calculation gives the maximum potential impact on charge-offs.
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